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* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007) (quoting Richard
Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321,
1328 (2000)).
2 Most notably, the Roberts Court has rejected facial challenges asserting violation of
abortion and First Amendment rights, two contexts in which facial challenges were previously
often accepted, see Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L.
Rev. 235, 269-72 (1993).  In the later years of the Rehnquist Court, the propriety of facial versus
as-applied challenges arose most prominently in the context of attacks on federal legislation as
exceeding constitutional limits on congressional power.  See generally Gillian Metzger, Facial
Challenges and Federalism, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (2005).  So far, the Roberts Court has
largely addressed the question in the context of individual rights litigation. 
3 Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct 1184, 1190,
1195 (2008); Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
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FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES UNDER THE ROBERTS COURT
Gillian E. Metzger*
One recurring theme of the early Roberts Court’s jurisprudence to date is its resistance to
facial constitutional challenges and preference for as-applied litigation.  On a number of
occasions the Court has rejected facial constitutional challenges while reserving the possibility
that narrower as-applied claims might succeed.  According to the Court, such as-applied claims
are “the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication.’”1  This preference for as-applied
over facial challenges has surfaced with some frequency, across terms and in contexts involving
different constitutional rights, at times garnering support from all the Justices on the Court.  
Moreover, the Roberts Court has advocated the as-applied approach in contexts in which facial
challenges were previously the norm, suggesting that it intends to restrict the availability of
facial challenges more than in the past.2
Unfortunately, the Roberts Court has not matched its consistency in preferring as-applied
constitutional adjudication with clarity about what this preference means in practice.   The Court
itself has noted that it remains divided over the appropriate test to govern when facial challenges
are available, with some justices arguing that facial challenges should succeed only where a
challenged measure is “unconstitutional in all of its applications” and others insisting on a
somewhat lower threshold.3  Equally or more important, the Court has made little effort to
describe the contours of as-applied litigation and has justified its preference for as-applied claims
on diverse grounds that yield different implications for the types of as-applied claims litigants
can bring.  At times, the Court has invoked the current lack of evidence about how a measure
will actually operate and the dangers of speculative adjudication, suggesting that it identifies as-
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applied challenges with post-enforcement actions.  At others, the Court concludes that most of
the time the challenged measure is plainly constitutional and reserves the as-applied option for
the rare instances when constitutional issues might arise, implying that what differentiates an as-
applied action is its narrow scope.  The Roberts Court also appears to use as-applied challenges
strategically, in particular as a device to evade recent precedent with which it disagrees, thereby
raising a question about whether its employment of the facial/as-applied distinction has a
principled core—and about whether its emphasis on this distinction will fade over time, as the
Court gradually shapes the contours of governing constitutional law.
Assessing the practical import of the Roberts Court’s facial/as-applied jurisprudence on
constitutional litigation is therefore difficult.  If the Court means to exclude pre-enforcement
challenges or require that specific applications of a measure be challenged one at a time, its
rejection of facial challenges in favor of as-applied claims will in practice raise substantial
impediments to asserting constitutional rights in federal court.  Such a restrictive approach to as-
applied challenges would also mark a notable deviation from existing precedent.  But an
examination of the Roberts Court’s recent decisions reveals they do not go so far, and do not
require such a narrow reading of what constitutes an acceptable as-applied challenge.  Instead,
the Roberts Court’s resistance to facial challenges is largely in keeping with longer-term trends
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence—with respect both to the Court’s understanding of what
constitutes an as-applied challenge, the scope of the Court’s remedial authority to carve away a
measure’s unconstitutional dimensions, and strategic use of the facial versus as-applied
distinction.  
What sets the Roberts Court apart is its understanding of the substantive scope of
particular constitutional rights.  Not surprisingly, that substantive understanding plays a major
role in determining the Court’s rejection (and acceptance) of facial challenges in different
contexts.  As a result, to the extent these decisions signal greater obstacles to assertion of certain
constitutional rights in the federal courts, those obstacles likely result as much, if not more, from
retraction in the substantive scope of those rights as from general jurisdictional rules regarding
the appropriate form of constitutional adjudication.
In what follows, I begin by giving an overview of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence on
facial and as-applied challenges.  I then turn to distilling the implications of these decisions for
individual rights adjudication in the federal courts, focusing on the Court’s understanding of as-
applied challenges, its approach to severability and remedial authority, and the role played by
substantive constitutional law.
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROBERTS COURT’S FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CASE LAW
In its now over-three-term existence, the Roberts Court has often invoked the terms facial
or as-applied to describe its analysis, and these characterizations could be attached to many
others.   What follows is a description of a number of decisions, broken down by term, that I
believe are making them of particular relevance to tracing the Court’s approach to facial and as-
applied challenges.  For the most part, these are decisions in which the Court paid express
4546 U.S. 151 (2006).
5546 U.S. 320 (2006).
6546 U.S. 410 (2006).
7 In WRTL I, the Court held that its prior decision in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003), sustaining the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) against facial
challenge did not preclude subsequent as-applied challenges to BCRA’s constitutionality.  546
U.S. at 411-12.  In Georgia the Court did not expressly couch its analysis in as-applied terms,
however the as-applied character of its approach was readily apparent.  The Court there avoided
questions about the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by
emphasizing that the claims involved in the case alleged actual constitutional violations, which it
held were plainly within Congress’s enforcement power to remedy.  546 U.S. at 158-59.  
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attention to the facial/as-applied distinction, usually arguing that the facial cast of a challenge
was inappropriate.  But it also includes a couple of instances in which the Court did not
characterize its approach as falling within the facial or as-applied category, yet its analysis was
notably facial or as-applied in tone, especially when considered against precedent in the area and
claims raised in the case. 
A. The 2005-2006 Term
The Roberts Court’s preference for as applied over facial constitutional challenges
became evident early on, in three decisions issued while Justice O’Connor was still a member of
the Court:  United States v. Georgia,4 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,5
and Wisconsin Right-to-Life v. FCC (WRTL I).6  All three are notable primarily for their
unanimity and brevity, notwithstanding the contentious issues they addressed—abortion rights,
Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and campaign
finance.  The Court’s decisions in Georgia and WRTL I indicated the potential advantages of
as-applied challenges; in both, the as-applied nature of the claims being brought was central to
the Court’s willingness to allow the suits at issue to go forward.7  Only in Ayotte, however, did
the facial versus as-applied question get much sustained discussion, and there it arose in terms of
the appropriateness of facial invalidation as a remedy rather than the availability of a facial
challenge.
Ayotte involved an effort to have a newly-enacted New Hampshire parental consent
statute declared facially unconstitutional because it did not allow a minor to obtain an abortion
without prior notice to her parent when an immediate abortion was needed to preserve her health. 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor had little trouble concluding that the failure to
include a health exception was a constitutional violation, given evidence of medical risk and the
8 According to the Court, New Hampshire did not seriously dispute that minors might
need an immediate abortion for health reasons in rare cases, and the Court’s precedents made
clear that a state could not “restrict access to abortions that are ‘necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.’” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at
327 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879
(1992) (internal quotations omitted)).
9 Id at 331.
10 Id at 329-31.
11 See Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial
Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 S.M. U. L . Rev. 1735, 1757 (2006);
Posting of Richard Pildes to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com (Jan. 23, 2006, 17:48
EST) (arguing that Justice O'Connor's imminent retirement, mid-Term, shaped the narrow
holdings in these cases).
12 The Stenberg Court referred to intact D & E abortions as D &X abortions, short for
dilation and extraction; the Nebraska and federal statutes refer to them as “partial-birth”
abortions.  For consistency, I use here simply “intact D & E,” the term the Court opted for in
Gonzales.  127 S. Ct. at 1621.
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Court’s precedents emphasizing the need for such health exceptions in abortion restrictions.8 
But she emphasized that this constitutional infirmity need not lead to the statute’s being
“invalidated . . . wholesale,” given that “[o]nly a few applications” of the statute that “would
present a constitutional problem.”9  Identifying “‘partial rather facial invalidation’” as “the
‘normal rule,’” provided partial invalidation accorded with legislative preferences, the Court
remanded for the appellate court to determine if “New Hampshire’s legislature intended the
statute to be susceptible to such a remedy.”10
B. The 2006-2007 Term
All three of the decisions described above were issued in a period of transition—indeed,
in Justice O’Connor’s last month on the Court—raising the possibility that their as-applied focus
was an interim phenomenon.11  But the Robert Court’s preference for as-applied analysis has
continued to surface, albeit without the unanimity that marked these early decisions.   Two
prominent examples from the Roberts Court’s second Term are Gonzales v. Carhart and FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL II).  Gonzales involved facial challenges to the constitutionality
of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, which sought to prohibit intact dilation and
evacuation (D & E) abortions, when the fetus is removed intact.12  Seven years earlier, in
Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court had sustained a facial challenge to a similar Nebraska measure,
finding it unconstitutional on two fronts: first, because the Nebraska measure lacked a health
exception; and second, because the Court concluded it could also apply to ordinary D& E
abortions, the most common method used to perform second-trimester abortions, and therefore
13 530 U.S. 914, 937-38, 945-46 (2000). 
14 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1627-32.
15 530 U.S. at 937-38.
16 127 S. Ct. at 1636, 1638.
17 Id. at 1638.  In addition, Justice Kennedy noted that “no as-applied challenge need be
brought if the prohibition in the Act threatens a woman’s life because the Act already contains a
life exception.”  Id. at 1639.
18 540 U.S. 93, 206-209 (2003).
19 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2); see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204.
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created an undue burden on women’s access to abortion.13  In a contentious 5-4 decision, the
Court in Gonzales rejected a similar facial challenge.  In his opinion for the majority, Justice
Kennedy held that the federal ban was more carefully crafted than the Nebraska measure to
apply only to intact D&E abortions, emphasizing in particular the federal statute’s intent
requirements.14  
Harder to square with Stenberg was the Court’s willingness to sustain the federal ban
notwithstanding that it, too, lacked a health exception.  In so ruling, Justice Kennedy
underscored the existence of medical uncertainty regarding whether the intact D&E procedure
might be needed to avoid a significant health risk to women.  Although Stenberg had concluded
that such uncertainty made a health exception necessary,15 in Gonzales Justice Kennedy took the
opposite view, concluding that medical uncertainty was sufficient to allow the federal ban to
survive facial attack even absent a health exception.16  Indeed, according to Justice Kennedy,
“these facial attacks should not have been entertained in the first place,” and instead an as-
applied challenge was “the proper manner to protect the health of the woman if it could be
shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur
in which the procedure . . . must be used.”17 
The decision in WRTL II is similarly hard to square with precedent.  In McConnell v.
FEC, a 2003 decision, the Court rejected a facial challenge to section 203 of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) alleging that the section violated First Amendment rights to
engage in political speech.18  Section 203 had extended the prohibition on use of corporate and
union treasury funds to include all advertisements that refer to clearly identified federal
candidates within sixty days of an election, and not simply advertisements expressly advocating
the election or defeat of federal candidates.19  But four years later, in WRTL II, the Court
sustained an as-applied challenge raising a similar claim of section 203’s unconstitutionality. 
The decision in WRTL II was badly fractured.  Chief Justice Roberts, in an opinion joined in
relevant part only by Justice Alito, held that section 203 was only constitutional as applied to
20 WRTL II, 127 S.Ct 2652, 2667, 2673.  As Nate Persily and Jennifer Rosenberg note,
one peculiar aspect of WRTL II is that Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion opted to adopt this
language rather than the backup language actually contained in BCRA, in case the broad
definition of prohibited electioneering communications were found unconstitutional.  The back-
up language provided that section 203’s prohibition would apply only to communications that, in
addition to either promoting or opposing a candidate for federal office,  “is suggestive of no
plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.” 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(f)(3)(A)(ii).  This back-up definition was not even mentioned in Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion, despite the close similarity to the standard his opinion adopted to govern future as-
applied challenges.  See Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?  The
Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court’s
Recent Election Law Decisions, __ Minn. L. Rev. __ (unpublished manuscript at 17-18).
21 127 S. Ct., at 2663-65, 2674; see also id. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 2683-84 & n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Kennedy and
Thomas, JJ.); id. at 2699-700 (dissenting opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ.); see also Richard Briffault, WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign Finance’s
Long and Winding Road, 1 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 101, 102, 113-130 (2008) (describing why
McConnell and WRTL II are incompatible incompatibility).
23 See also Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 31 (characterizing WRTL II as an “exit
strategy from disputed precedent”).  This reluctance to overrule precedent has surfaced in other
decisions not involving facial challenges.  See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 127 S. Ct.
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advertisements that were “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to
vote for or against a specific candidate.”20  But the Chief Justice insisted that McConnell
remained good law, invoking the distinction between facial and as applied challenges to justify
the different results in the two cases.  He argued that McConnell stood for the principle that the
ban on use of corporate and union treasury funds could apply to advertisements that were
express advocacy or its “functional equivalent,” but had not defined what would qualify as the
functional equivalent of express advocacy in an as-applied challenge.21  By contrast, the other
seven justices all concluded that WRTL II essentially overrode McConnell, disagreeing only
about whether that was a good or bad thing.22 
The fact that only two Justices signed onto the emphasis on facial versus as-applied
challenges in WRTL II makes it hard to read the decision as a further signal of newfound
affection for as-applied challenges on the Court as a whole.  Indeed, viewed in its entirety, the
different opinions in WRTL II demonstrate limits on the extent to which the Justices accord the
facial versus as-applied distinction determinative significance.  Nonetheless, the principal
opinion’s invocation of the distinction merits note.  If nothing else, WRTL II stands as
evidence—along with Carhart—that the facial versus as-applied distinction is being used by the
Roberts Court to reach results more in keeping with the substantive views of the Court’s new
membership without expressly overruling recent precedent.23  WRTL II is also interesting as an
2553, 2556-68, 2571-72 (2007) (restricting Flast v. Cohen’s provision of taxpayer standing to
raise Establishment Clause challenges to challenges brought against congressional enactments
and rejecting arguments that the suits should be viewed as-applied challenges to specific
implementations of congressional statutes). 
24 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
25 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
26 For a discussion of the extent to which the Roberts Court is invoking the facial versus
as-applied distinction in the election law context, see generally Persily & Rosenberg, supra note
20.
27  Washington Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1193-95; Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622-23.
28 Washington Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195.
29 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622-23. 
7
instance in which the promise of as-applied challenges translated into a vibrant protection for
individual rights, notwithstanding failure of a facial challenge.  The generalizability of this result
is severely compromised, however, by the likelihood that the Roberts Court would have
sustained the facial challenge of McConnell, if faced with such a challenge without precedent on
point.
C. The 2008-2009 Term
The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges surfaced again last Term.  Here
two decisions, Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party24 and Crawford
v. Marion County Election Board,25 deserve special note because of the extent to which they
emphasized the facial nature of the challenges before them.  Washington State Grange and
Crawford share many features.  Both decisions arose in the election context, with Washington
State Grange involving a facial challenge to a blanket primary system and Crawford involving a
facial challenge to a voter ID law.26  Both decisions rejected the facial challenges before them
and did so because of a lack of evidence that the challenged measures would burden First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Equally important, both tied this result to the fact that neither
law had yet gone into effect and evidence of how they would operate in practice was lacking.27 
In Washington State Grange, Justice Thomas writing for the majority noted that an as-applied
challenge might succeed in the future, were evidence of burden to become apparent once the
primary system was operative.28  In Crawford, Justice Stevens’ principal opinion did not
expressly mention the possibility of a future as-applied challenge, but its repeated emphasis on
the weakness of the evidentiary record currently before the Court carried the same implication.29 
30 See 128 S. Ct. at 1194; id. at 1197.(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
31 See 128 S. Ct. at 1616-20, 1623 & n.20; see also id. at 1624-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
32 Compare 128 S. Ct. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Alito and
Thomas, JJ.) (arguing that individual burdens were not relevant in assessing the constitutionality
of “a generally acceptable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation.”) with ;id. at 1632 (Souter, J.,
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (arguing the record contained sufficient evidence that the
voter ID law threatened to impose serious burdens on the voting rights of a significant number of
individuals) and id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (similarly arguing sufficient evidence of
burden in record to sustain facial challenge).
33 All of these features of Heller have received extended commentary elsewhere.  See,
e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Op-Ed, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, Wall St. J.,
June 27, 2008 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest example of what is now called ‘original
public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or
Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 193-94 (2008)
(outlining tensions in Heller from an originalist perspective and arguing that the decision reflects
changed popular understandings about gun rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment
Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 246, 267-72 (2008) (emphasizing limited
scope of the right identified in Heller and arguing that Heller is an instance of judicial
minimalism); Postings of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/(June 27,
2008 00:08 EST and July 2, 2008, 9:31 EST (arguing that Heller was possible due to gun-rights
social movement and analyzing Heller’s originalist methodology).
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Yet notable differences between the two exist.  In Washington State Grange the Court
displayed some sympathy for the constitutional claim before it, and in dicta—supplemented
further in Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence—indicated the limited ways in which Washington
could implement the party preference statute without running afoul of the First Amendment.30  In
Crawford, by contrast, the lead opinion and concurrence were more receptive to the state
interests at stake and doubtful that the measure would ever prove unconstitutional.31  In addition,
the two decisions are distinguished by the extent to which the Court as a whole perceived a
meaningful difference between facial and as-applied challenges before it.  Seven justices signed
onto the majority opinion in Washington State Grange, whereas Crawford, like WRTL II, was far
more fractured with respect to the relevance of the facial versus as-applied distinction, with a
majority of the Justices concluding that further factual development should not make a
difference, albeit for very different reasons.32
Last Term also stands out for the Court’s willingness to sustain two facial constitutional
challenges.  The most prominent of these was District of Columbia v. Heller, a 5-4 decision in
which the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that D.C.’s handgun ban violated
the Second Amendment.  Heller is a striking decision on many fronts, most notably its originalist
methodology, revival of the Second Amendment, and efforts to exclude a variety of firearm
restrictions from the scope of the Second Amendment it was reviving.33  A less prominent feature
34 More precisely, D.C. prohibited registration of handguns, but that translated into a ban
on possession of handguns as carrying an unregistered firearm is crime under D.C. law.  See
D.C. Code §§ 7-2501.01912), 7-2502.01(a), 7502(a)(4) (2001).  D.C. separately allowed
carrying handgun under a 0ne-year license.  §§ 22-4504(a), 22-4506 (no carrying of a handgun
without a license); see generally Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.
35 D.C. Code § 7-2507.02 (2001)
36 128 S. Ct. at 2818-19.
37 Id. at 2817-18.  Equally notable is the opinion’s refusal to adopt a narrowing
construction that would carve out a self-defense exception to the relevant D.C. statutes
mandating that weapons be kept unloaded and subject to trigger locks.  Id. at 2818; see also id. at
2853-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have adopted such a
construction).  While Justice Scalia justified that refusal on the grounds that the statute was not
susceptible to such a reading, that leaves unexplained why the Court did not carve out such an
exception as constitutionally mandated, as it has done in other contexts when a challenged
statute has unconstitutional applications.  See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
172-73, 183-84 (1983) (invalidating statute prohibiting display of flags, banners, or devices in
the “Supreme Court building and on its grounds” only as applied to public sidewalks
surrounding the Court, even though provision made no separate mention of sidewalks); see also
Metzger, supra note 2, at 886 (discussing application severance).
38 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
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of Heller is the facial nature of the claim the Court upheld.   D.C. had prohibited all possession
of handguns except if granted a license by the police,34 and in addition provided that residents
must keep lawful weapons in their homes unloaded or protected by a trigger lock.35  The Court
ruled not only that the Second Amendment protected an inherent right of self-defense, but further
that the D.C. measure violated this right because it represented a total ban on handgun
possession in the home.  In so ruling, Justice Scalia dismissed the argument that whether the
handgun ban ultimately violated individuals’ Second Amendment right should turn on the extent
to which D.C. residents could adequately protect their homes using other weapons.36  Instead,
although limited to the context of self-defense in the home, the Heller opinion treats handgun
bans in that context as essentially facially unconstitutional.37  
The second decision sustaining a facial challenge, Davis v. FEC,38 was less remarkable,
albeit important in its own right for its implications for campaign finance reform.  At issue in 
Davis was section 319 of BCRA, part of the so-called millionaire’s amendment.  Section 319
tripled the federal campaign contribution ceilings for House candidates facing opponents who
spent over a certain amount of their own funds on their own campaigns, while keeping the
contribution limits on the self-financing candidate at the usual level.  By a 5-4 vote, the Court
held that such differential contribution limits unconstitutionally burdened self-financing
candidates’ First Amendment rights to spend their own funds on their campaigns.  
39 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 240, 250, 253 (2006) (invalidating Vermont’s
expenditure and contribution limits); see also text accompanying notes 18-22 (discussing
Roberts Court’s greater hostility to regulation of election communications).  The resistance to
expenditure limits and efforts to equalize spending is not an innovation of the Roberts Court, but
instead dates back to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-54 (1976)(per curiam).
40 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2767.
41 Put differently, the restrictive Salerno standard for the availability of facial
challenges—that there be no set of circumstances in which the challenged measure could
constitutionally be applied,481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)—was met here, because section 319’s
unconstitutional tying feature would necessarily be present whenever the section applied.
42 See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 528-531 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing
implications of Roberts Court’s jurisprudence on facial and as-applied challenges for Fourth
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That the Davis Court found such differential contribution limits to violate the First
Amendment is not surprising, given the direction of the Roberts Courts’ prior campaign finance
decisions and in particular its resistence to arguments regarding the need to limit expenditures.39 
Somewhat more surprising, in light of Washington Grange and Crawford, was the majority’s
willingness to invalidate section 319 on a facial challenge, rather than awaiting evidence that the
section led a large number of self-financing candidates to curtail their expenditures.  One
difference is that Davis involved a post-enforcement facial challenge; Davis was a self-financing
candidate who spent over section 319’s threshold on his own campaign and who faced
enforcement action by the FEC for failing to file disclosure statements required by section 319.
Yet it seems unlikely that Davis’ post-enforcement status mattered to the Court’s willingness to
entertain a facial challenge.  Davis’ opponent never sought to take advantage of section 319's
differential contribution limits,40 and as a result Davis’ own experience provides little insight on
how burdensome the section might prove in practice.  Instead, the majority’s willingness to
sustain a facial challenge appears to reflect its view that tying contribution limits to self-
financing candidates’ expenditures categorically burdens the latter’s First Amendment rights,
whether or not this differential contribution scheme actually leads such candidates to curtail
spending or allowed their opponents to seek bigger contributions.  Given that such tying was a
plain and uncontroverted feature of section 319, the Court would most likely have been willing
to sustain a pre-enforcement facial challenge to the section as well.41 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ROBERTS COURT FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS LITIGATION
This overview of the Roberts Courts’ recent jurisprudence establishes both the frequency
with which that Court has emphasized the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges
and its preference for the latter as a mode for constitutional rights litigation.  Lower courts have
taken heed, with appellate decisions increasingly containing extensive discussion of the
appropriateness of a facial versus as-applied approach.42  As a result, the distinction between
Amendment claim); Richmond Med. Ctr. v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 146-48 (4th Cir. 2008)
(analyzing whether facial overbreadth claim can be brought to abortion statutes after Gonzales);
North Car. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 285-86, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2007) (justifying
facial invalidation of state campaign finance regulation in light of Roberts Court’s recent
decisions); Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 333-35, 339-40 (6th
Cir. 2007) (analyzing combined effect of Ayotte, Gonzales, and Stenberg on appropriateness of
facial invalidation of Michigan abortion restriction);
43 See  Dorf, supra note 2, at 236-238 (describing disagreement on the Rehnquist Court
about the appropriate standard to use to judge the availability of facial challenges in the abortion
context ); Metzger, supra note 2, at 875-76 (describing debate over availability of facial
challenges in the Section 5 enforcement power context).  Indeed, one of the most famous and
invoked decisions cautioning against facial challenges dates back to 1960, United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), and the issue also surfaces in early New Deal decisions, though
generally discussed there in terms of severability, see, e.g., R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295
U.S. 330, 361-62 (1935).
44 124 S. Ct. 739, 745 (1987).
45 Dorf, supra note 2, at 271-76, 279-81; Fallon, supra note 1, at 1335-41; Metzger, supra
note 2, at 878-79; compare City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n. 22 (1999) (Stevens,
J.) (plurality opinion) (stating that Salerno is not the governing standard for facial challenges)
with id at 74-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(asserting that Salerno is the appropriate standard).
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facial and as-applied challenges seems likely to continue to be a prominent feature of
constitutional litigation in the years to come.
Such attention to the facial/as-applied distinction is certainly not unique to the Roberts
Court.  On the contrary, the distinction surfaced repeatedly in the Rehnquist Court’s
jurisprudence and periodically arose in prior periods as well.43  Rehnquist Court decisions often
expressed similar disapproval of facial challenges, famously stating in United States v. Salerno
that facial challenges should succeed only when “no set of circumstances exists under which the
[challenged measure] would be valid.”44  In practice, however, the Rehnquist Court proved more
willing to sustain facial challenges than the extreme Salerno standard would suggest, with the
most well-known (but not only) exceptions involving the First Amendment and abortion rights.45
Whether the Roberts Court will similarly prove more willing to accept facial challenges
in practice than its rhetoric to date would suggest is still very much an open question.   Similarly
unclear is whether the as-applied option will prove to be a real avenue for asserting
constitutional rights or instead will exist more in theory than in practice.  Part of the reason for
this uncertainty is that the Roberts Court appears to invoke the facial/as-applied distinction to
respond to diverse concerns—sometimes emphasizing institutional competency and limits on the
judicial role, sometimes motivated by more strategic calculations—each of yields potentially
different implications for when facial challenges would be available and whether the as-applied
46 See Metzger, supra note 2, at 881-83.
47 Fallon, supra note 1, at 1341.
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route is actually a meaningful option.  Another contributing factor is the Roberts Court’s failure
to define what it means by an as-applied challenge.  Such a challenge can take a variety of forms,
some of which appear quite “facial” in that they target a statute’s application to a range of
cases.46  As Richard Fallon has noted, “facial challenges are less categorically distinct from as-
applied challenges than is often thought.”47  The extent to which the Roberts Court’s preference
for as-applied challenges significantly curtails constitutional rights litigation will turn on how
restrictive a definition of as-applied challenges it adopts.
Nonetheless, these decisions yield some useful insights about the shape of constitutional
rights litigation under the Roberts Court.  First, despite its lack of clarity on the question, the
Court occasionally has employed a quite broad understanding of what constitutes an as-applied
challenge.  In particular, the Court does not consistently restrict as-applied challenges to
instances in which individuals solely target application of measures to themselves, or require as-
applied challenges be raised post-enforcement.   In addition, underlying the Robert Court’s
rejection of facial challenges is a capacious view of the Court’s remedial authority to sever
unconstitutional statutory applications and provisions.  That suggests a willingness on the part of
the Court to give real bite to as-applied challenges across a range of contexts, even if the effect
of doing so is to dramatically transform the statutory scheme at issue.  Yet the strategic cast of
many of these decisions also raises the possibility that the as-applied options preserved by the
Court are primarily included to reach a desired result in the case at hand and thus not intended to
have lasting significance.  Perhaps most important, these decisions reveal that both the
availability of facial challenges and the viability of as-applied challenges turns ultimately on
substantive constitutional law.  As a result, the practical impact of the Court’s approach cannot
be accurately assessed at a macro level, and will instead turn on the particular substantive
constitutional right at issue.  
48 Metzger, supra note 2, at 881 (quoting Paul M. Bator et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 662 (3d ed.1993)).
49 See id. at 881-83.
50 See, e.g., Washington State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1190-91; Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at
1622; Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
51 Metzger, supra note 2, at 882-83.
52 See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 5; David H. Gans, Strategic Facial
Challenges, 85 B.U. L Rev 1333, 1336 (2005). Class actions are unlikely to serve as a means of
alleviating this need for repeated litigation, because plaintiffs would be unlikely to be found
representative of a class in a regime that required as-applied constitutional challenges to be
narrowly tied to specific facts.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
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A. The Shape of As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court
Just as the Roberts Court is not unique in its frequently-voiced disaffection for facial
challenges, so too it not alone in failing to offer a clear definition of what it understands the
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges to be.  As I have previously noted, over the
years the governing understanding of what constitutes these two forms of challenges appears to
have changed.  Facial challenges were once understood to encompass any challenge that “puts
into issue an explicit rule of law, as formulated by the legislature or the court, and involves the
facts only insofar as it is necessary to establish that the rule served as a basis for decision.”48 
Under this definition, facial challenges could be limited to assertions of partial
unconstitutionality and did not necessarily entail the claim that a measure was unconstitutional in
all of its applications.  As-applied challenges, by contrast, were defined in fairly narrow terms
synonymous with privilege.  Today, however, facial challenges are generally equated with
claims of unconstitutionality in toto, in part the result of eliding the litigation form of a facial
challenge with the remedial result of total invalidation.49  This identification of facial challenges
with total invalidation is often what underlies judicial condemnation of facial challenges.50  
Such a  narrowed understanding of what constitutes a facial challenge need not matter in
practice, provided the definition of as-applied challenges is correspondingly expanded to include
claims of unconstitutionality that go beyond a particular plaintiffs’ claims of privilege and
include claims alleging that a range of a statute’s applications are unconstitutional.51    If,
however, as-applied challenges are limited to the plaintiff’s specific situation or identical
contexts, then prohibitions on facial challenges erect a more substantial barrier to successful
assertion of constitutional rights.  Many more suits might be required to trim away a challenged
measure’s unconstitutional application.  Even if subsequent plaintiffs could claim the benefits or
stare decisis or issue preclusion, they would still face the costs and burdens of litigation.52 
53 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-34 (2004)) (upholding Title II of the
ADA as applied to enforcing the constitutional right of access to the Court, rather than as applied
to the specific criminal defense and employment contexts of the plaintiffs); see Metzger, supra
note ?, at 917 (discussing this feature of the Court’s approach in Lane).
54 See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2665-66; see especially id. at 2666 (“A test focused on the
speaker’s intent could lead to the bizarre result that identical ads aired at the same time could be
protected speech for one speaker, while leading to criminal penalties for another.”); see also
Briffault, supra note 22, at 119-21 (describing this as the effect of WRTL II). 
55 128 S. Ct. at 1623.  Elsewhere, Justice Stevens’ opinion discusses the burdens
experienced by particular groups of voters—elderly persons born out-of-state, other persons who
have difficulty obtaining required documentation , indent voters, homeless voters, and voters
with religious objections to being photographed.  See id. at 1621-23
56 See, e.g., 128 S. Ct. at 1194; see also Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 22-23
(arguing that any subsequent relief would need to be broad).
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The Roberts Court does not appear to be taking such a restrictive approach to as-applied
litigation, but instead is adhering to the Rehnquist Court’s practice of allowing as-applied
challenges not limited to the specific parties at hand.53  To the contrary, in WRTL II the Court
demonstrated the extraordinary breadth of relief available under an as-applied challenge.  There
the Court rejected a case-by-case approach that would tie application of BCRA’s section 203 to
the intent and effect of particular advertisements, and instead crafted a standard that likely will
serve to exempt most (if not all) non-express advertisements from the section’s scope.54 
Although WRTL II’s approach to as-applied challenges is the broadest of the Robert Court’s
jurisprudence to date, its other decisions are similar in suggesting that as-applied litigation would
not need to be case-specific but instead could raise claims against a statute in certain classes of
contexts.  For example, Justice Stevens’ lead opinion in Crawford strongly suggests that as-
applied litigation could be brought on behalf of “any class of voters” experiencing excessive
burdens under Indiana’s voter id law, rather than on a voter-by-voter basis.55  Washington State
Grange is more elliptical, but the majority’s discussion of the degree of voter confusion
associated with different ballots suggests that an as-applied suit could lead to invalidation of the
method the state used to identify candidate party preferences on a ballot, and would not be
limited to challenging the ballot as applied to a particular candidate or party.56
The decision most suggestive of a restrictive approach to as-applied challenges is
Gonzales, with its statement that “[t]he [Federal Partial-Birth] Act is open to a proper as-applied
57 127 S. Ct. at 1639; see also id. at 1638 (“discrete and well-defined instances”); id. at
1639 (“It is neither our nor within our traditional institutional role to resolve questions of
constitutionality with respect to each potential situation that might develop.”) (emphasis added).
58 See id. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court offers no clue on what a
‘proper’ lawsuit might look like.”).
59 Id. at 1638.
60 546 U.S. at 328, 331; see also Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Even if courts were able to carve-out exceptions through piecemeal litigation for ‘discrete and
well-defined instances,” women whose circumstances have not been anticipated by prior
litigation may well be left unprotected.”)
61 See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100
Yale L. J. 853, 867-77 (1991) (discussing prophylactic and rule of law bases for overbreadth
doctrine). 
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challenge in a discrete case.”57  What the Court means by this is unclear,58 and the reference to
“discrete case” could be read to suggest that each woman in need of an intact D&E abortion
must bring suit to challenge application of the statute as to her specifically.   Such an approach
would be quite extreme, however, and is inconsistent with other language in the decision stating
that an as-applied challenge would provide an opportunity for plaintiffs to show that “in discrete
and well-defined instances” particular conditions are likely to occur requiring the use of the
intact D&E method.59  Thus, Gonzales appears to contemplate that, at the least, as-applied suits
could be brought on a condition-by-condition basis.  Although this is itself a narrower approach
to as-applied challenges than that suggested just the year before in Ayotte, which appeared to
allow a court to essentially enjoin application of a challenged abortion regulation whenever the
regulation would impose a “significant health risk” on women,60 it is still broader that one
requiring each woman facing medical risk to separately bring suit.
A requirement that litigants bring their constitutional challenges post-enforcement, or
more extremely only once a measure had actually been applied to them, could also prove
burdensome to effective constitutional rights litigation.  Overbreadth doctrine has long justified
facial challenges, particularly in the First Amendment context, on the concern that individuals
will forego constitutionally protected activities out of fears of criminal or civil liability.61 
Requiring as-applied challenges be post-enforcement similarly might “chill” individuals’
exercise of constitutional rights, and further forestall their ability to challenge putatively
unconstitutional measures altogether because those complying with the measure may lack
standing to sue.  In addition, some individuals may be willing to bring a preenforcement action,
but lack incentive to do so once they have suffered the injury a preenforcement suit would have
62 Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 2 (noting lack of incentive to sue after election
day).
63 See, e.g., Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152-53 (1967); ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 146-148; see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Co., 486 US 750, 770 n. 11 (1988)
(rejecting suggestion that facial challenges must await enforcement).
64 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622-23 ; Washington State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1193-94.
65 127 S. Ct. at 1638.  Gonzales’ willingness to allow pre-enforcement suits makes its
insistence on a subsequent as-applied challenge hard to understand; as Justice Ginsburg noted in
dissent, the record in that case already contained substantial evidence addressing when intact
D&E might better protect women’s health, id. at 1652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), as well as
evidence to the contrary from the opponents of the technique, id. at 1635-36 (documenting
medical disagreement over need for intact D&E).  Notwithstanding the majority’s assertion to
the contrary, id. at 1638-39, it is hard to imagine what additional evidence would be available in
a pre-enforcement as-applied challenge, and the appropriate course under the Court’s precedent
would be to enjoin application of the ban on intact D&E in contexts where it posed a severe
health risk rather than require an additional as-applied suit. 
This might lead to skepticism regarding whether Gonzales meant what it said about the
availability of pre-enforcement as-applied challenges.  But denying pre-enforcement challenges
here is tantamount to denying that women had a constitutional right not to be subjected to a
health risk by abortion restrictions; as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, “[a] woman
suffering from medical complications needs access to the medical procedure at once and cannot
wait for the judicial process to unfold.”  Id. at 1651-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  To my mind
the better explanation is that the Gonzales majority—or at least Justice Kennedy, the majority
opinion’s author—neither wanted to forestall pre-enforcement challenges nor to reverse its
longstanding jurisprudence holding that women had a constitutional right to be free from
significant health risks from abortion regulations, but also believed that intact D&E was never
really medically necessary.  Kennedy had previously rejected the medical necessity argument for
intact D&E in his Stenberg dissent.  Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 967 (2000) (Kennedy, J.
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forestalled.62   The belief that individuals should not be forced to either subject themselves to
potentially irreparable harm by violating a statute or comply and thereby cede their ability to
challenge it underlies the Court’s seminal decisions establishing the availability of
preenforcement declaratory or injunctive relief.63
The Roberts Court’s stance on whether as-applied challenges generally can be brought
pre-enforcement is more ambiguous.  In Washington State Grange and Crawford the Court
appeared to equate as-applied challenges with post-enforcement suits, and its arguments against
the appropriateness of facial challenges all rested on its conclusion that an insufficient record of
burden existed prior to enforcement to support finding the challenges measures
unconstitutional.64  Yet in Gonzales, the Court explicitly noted that “pre-enforcement, as-applied
challenges . . . can be maintained.”65  Similarly, the breadth of relief in WRTL II precludes any
dissenting).  Yet evidence in the record of the potential health need for intact D&E was simply
too great to dismiss the medical necessity claim altogether, leading Justice Kennedy to the
solution of allowing pre-enforcement challenges but requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the need
for intact D&E as applied to specific contexts.
66 Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 21, 29.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Sabri, 541 U.S. 600, 608-10 (2004); Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 530-34 (2004); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24-25 (1960); see also Fallon,
supra note ,1 at 1329-31, 1342 (identifying the Court’s view that “the meaning of [a] statute was
not obvious, but needed to be specified, and . . . that specification would best occur through a
series of fact-specific, case-by-case decisions” as underlying the rejection of facial challenges)
68 See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 21-22, 26-27 
69 In Washington State Grange, for example, the Court identifies several ways that the
party affiliation statute could be constitutionally enforced, 128 S. Ct. at 1194-95, and in
Crawford the Court’s focus on particularly vulnerable groups of voters, 128 S. Ct. at 1620-21
strongly implies that it sees the voter ID statute as constitutional in general.
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suggestion that an individual must actually face an enforcement action before as-applied relief
would lie, and timing of suit plays little role in Davis.
As Nate Persily and Jennifer Rosenberg have noted, the Roberts Court in Washington
State Grange and Crawford appears to be using the facial/as-applied distinction to address what
are more commonly seen as ripeness and abstention concerns.66  Although the Court previously
has invoked factual uncertainty about how a measure will operate as grounds for rejecting a
facial challenge, it usually has done so in the course of holding that the measure is plainly
constitutional as applied in the case before the Court.67   Insofar as Washington State Grange and
Crawford argue for an as-applied approach because the constitutionality of the measures cannot
be assessed prior to enforcement, they represent a newer use of as-applied challenges. 
Moreover, as Persily and Rosenberg maintain, using as-applied challenges in this way could lead
to difficulty down the road, were the Court to conclude that in practice the measures prove to be
unconstitutionally burdensome across-the-board and thus should actually be invalidated in toto.68
That very incongruity, however, suggests these decisions are not limited to holding
simply that the records presented so far fail to prove the measures are broadly unconstitutional. 
Significantly, in these decisions the Court also appears to hold that both of the challenged
measures have a range of potentially constitutional applications.69  If so, the decisions are less
anomalous than their rejection of facial challenges on ripeness grounds might otherwise suggest. 
Instead, on this view the Court was simply presuming that any applications of the statute shown
to be unconstitutional in the future could be severed from its potential constitutional
applications.  As Ayotte noted and discussed further below, such presumptions of severability are
the “normal rule,” albeit less so in First Amendment contexts.
70 The degree to which the Court’s jurisprudence on facial and as-applied challenges
turns on severability is a matter of academic debate.  Marc Isserles and David Franklin have
argued that severability is less important than other scholars (myself included) believe.  Their
argument is premised on a distinction between two types of facial challenges, overbreadth facial
challenges and valid rule facial challenges.  Overbreadth facial challenges, as they define them,
involve a litigant against whom a statute can be constitutionally applied arguing that a court
should facially invalidate it because the statute cannot be constitutionally applied to others, and
those unconstitutional applications are either nonseverable or should be presumed to be
nonseverable.   Valid rule facial challenges, by contrast, focuses on the terms of the statute and
argues that under governing constitutional law the statute is unconstitutional in its entirety;
severability is not relevant here because there are no constitutional or unconstitutional
applications to sever.  See Marc Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the
Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 359, 365-66, 387 (1998); David L. Franklin, Facial
Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 41, 59-60, 64-67
(2006).   
My own view is that there may be less to this distinction between types of facial
challenges than meets the eye.  In part this is because I think instances in which measures are
unconstitutional in their entirety, and this unconstitutionality is not curable through severance,
are relatively (and appropriately) rare.   Contra Franklin, supra, at 65 (arguing that valid rule
facial challenges are ubiquitous); see also Metzger, supra, at 894-931 (arguing that such an all-
or-nothing approach has not dominated and is not appropriate in federalism contexts ).   In
addition, substantive constitutional law is the determinative factor in the success of both kinds of
facial challenges, because a large part of whether an “overbreadth facial challenge” prevails
depends on how broad is the range of unconstitutional applications, which in turn depends on
substantive constitutional law.
Regardless, even Isserles and Franklin acknowledge the importance of severability to
many facial challenges.  See Franklin, supra, at 65; Isserles, supra, at 368.  Moreover, the cases
in which the Roberts Court has rejected a facial challenge appear to fall into the overbreadth
category, in the Court’s treatment at least, which further underscores the relevance of
severability to the Roberts Court’s facial-as applied jurisprudence.
71 The valid rule requirement was famously posited by Henry Monaghan.  See Henry Paul
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3.
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B. Severability under the Roberts Court
Academic commentators have often emphasized the central role severability plays in
determining the availability of facial and as-applied challenges.70  If unconstitutional applications
or provisions of a challenged measure are not severable, then the measure is not a
constitutionally valid rule and cannot be applied to anyone—in short, it is invalid in its entirety.71 
Hence, when the Court rejects a facial challenge to a statute in favor of an as-applied approach, it
72 See Metzger, supra note 2, at 883-90; see also Dorf, supra note 2, at 242-44, 249-51
(discussing the valid rule requirement and the implied presumption of severability); Fallon, supra
note 1, at 1331-33 (same).
73 546 US 320, 329; see also id. (“the normal rule is that partial rather than facial,
invalidation is the required course”).
74 Id. at 330.
75 546 US at 329-30.
76 Id at 330.
77 See Metzger, supra note 2, at 886-887, 891-92 (noting that the Court does not often
discuss the relationship of severability and facial challenges and describing the rare debate over
application severability that arose in Booker).
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is implicitly presuming that any unconstitutional applications or provisions can be severed.72 
Equally important, the possibility of severability means that a facial challenge need not lead to
facial invalidation; instead, a Court potentially can respond to a facial challenge by trimming a
measure’s constitutionally problematic provisions or applications.
The Roberts Court acknowledged the centrality of severability in Ayotte.  There, the
Court stated that “[g]enerally speaking . . . we prefer to enjoin only the unconstitutional
applications . . . or sever [only] its problematic portions.”73  Moreover, Ayotte also identified the
principles that should guide courts in determining whether to sever.  According to the Court “the
touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent,” the question being “[w]ould the
legislature have preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all?”74  In addition, the Court
emphasized that its ability to craft partial remedies was limited by need to avoid “rewriting state
law to conform it to constitutional requirements” and by the clarity of “the background
constitutional rules at issue,” with the latter affecting “how easily [a court] can articulate the
remedy” and thus remove a statute’s unconstitutional applications without too “serious [an]
invasion of the legislative domain.”75  The Court also cautioned against the danger that
legislatures might cast nets as wide as possible, relying on the courts to trim measures to
constitutional proportions, arguing that such a situation “would, to some extent, substitute the
judicial for the legislative department of the government.”76  
Although these principles guiding severability analysis were not new, Ayotte’s careful
articulation of them in the context of rejecting a facial challenge was more unusual; the Court
has not frequently acknowledged the important role played by severability, particularly
application severability, in facial challenges.77  What made this articulation even more striking is
the lack of express discussion of these principles of severability analysis in the Roberts Court’s
subsequent decisions invoking as-applied challenges.  In almost none did the Court discuss
78 Only in Crawford did the Court make a passing reference to severability, see 128 S. Ct.
at 1623.
79 See, e.g., Pub. L. 108-105, § 2, Nov. 5, 2003, 117 State. 1201 (18 U.S.C. 1531 (Supp.
III 2003)).
80 Ayotte, 546 US at 331.
81 See Dorf, supra note 2, at 261, 264; Fallon, supra note 1, at 1346-47. 
82 See Monaghan, supra note , at 29-30; Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363-67 (2003)
(plurality op.)(holding that interpretation of provision of cross-burning statute contained in jury
instruction rendered statute facially invalid, but remanding for the Virginia Supreme Court to
interpret provision in a way that adequately addresses First Amendment concerns).
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whether severing unconstitutional applications would accord with legislative intent or amount to
judicial rewriting of a statute.78 
WRTL II is perhaps the most extreme on this front, given that the principal opinion there
inserted an entirely new test into the statute to identify those advertisements that corporate and
union treasuries can fund.   Such dramatic judicial recrafting of statutory language would seem
to require some assessment of whether the new test accorded with congressional intent, all the
more so given that the statute actually contained fallback language to use in the event that
section 203 were held unconstitutional.  Yet the Court nowhere examined whether its effort to
carve section 203 to constitutional proportions was one that it could legitimately adopt. 
Gonzales is another instance in which some discussion of the Ayotte principles would seem to be
in order before presuming that any unconstitutional applications of the statute would be
severable.  Not only did Gonzales involve exactly the same issue as Ayotte (the severability of
applications of an abortion restriction that unconstitutionally burden women’s health), but in
addition the omission of a health exception from the Partial Birth Act was plainly intentional on
Congress’s part.79   Consequently, as in Ayotte, surely “some dispute” existed “as to whether
[Congress] intended the statute to be susceptible to such a remedy”80 as well as whether severing
unconstitutional applications here would be an institutionally appropriate action for the Court to
take.  Yet the Gonzales Court nowhere addressed the question in affirming the availability of as-
applied challenges.
Washington State Grange is also interesting from a severability perspective.  In the First
Amendment context the Court has often taken a prophylactic approach and presumed that
unconstitutional applications are not severable.81  This nonseverability presumption, which
underlies First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, has the side effect of requiring that any
necessary trimming of state statutes to meet constitutional requirements ordinarily be done by
state courts.82  In Washington State Grange, the Court deviated on both fronts, in essence
applying a presumption of severability in the face of a First Amendment challenge and further
indicating quite clearly, notwithstanding the lack of any prior interpretation of the statute by the
83 See 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95; see also id. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J. concurring) (noting
that “if the ballot merely lists the candidates’ preferred parties next to the candidates’ names, or
otherwise fails clearly to convey that the parties and the candidates are note necessarily
associated, the I-872 system would not survive a First Amendment challenge.”) 
84 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622-23; United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1838,
1844 (2008) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to child pornography conviction under the
federal PROTECT Act and stating that any unconstitutional application of act could be the basis
for an as-applied challenge); Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2382-83
(2007) (upholding statutory requirement of affirmative authorization from nonmembers before
union may spend agency-shop fees for election purposes against First Amendment challenge
only as-applied to public sector union and reserving question of application to private sector
unions, noting in part that no overbreadth challenge had been made brought).   Such a pullback
on overbreadth doctrine has been ongoing for a while, with the Court not only requiring that a
measure be substantially overbroad “‘judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep,’” but also
overlooking state failures to narrow statutes to constitutional proportions.  See, e.g., Virginia v.
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (quoting Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
85 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (“[T]he provision of the federal
sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory . . . [is] incompatible with today’s
constitutional holding.  We conclude that this provision must be severed and excised. . . . So
modified, the federal sentencing statute makes the Guidelines effectively advisory.”  (internal
citations omitted)); see also, Metzger, supra note 2, at 890-93 (discussing Booker).  Another
example of this broad willingness to sever or presume severability under the Rehnquist Court
was that Court’s approach to Section 5 challenges in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530
(limiting the analysis of whether Title II is a permissible use of Congress’s Section 5 power to
the statute’s application in enforcing the right of access to the courts as opposed to guaranteeing
access to a host of other public spaces and events that could also be viewed as covered by the
statute).
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Washington courts, the limited ways in which Washington could implement the statute without
violating the Constitution.83  Crawford and other Roberts Court decisions similarly presumed
severability in the face of First Amendment challenges.84  This suggests that the special First
Amendment nonseverability presumption is currently endangered, if not extinguished, with the
Roberts Court not receptive to overbreadth claims even in this context.
In short, despite its caveats in Ayotte, the Roberts Courts appears quite willing to engage
in broad statutory severance and reconstruction when necessary to defeat a facial constitutional
challenge, even of state measures.  Interestingly, in asserting such broad remedial authority the
Roberts Court is following in the footsteps of its predecessor.  One of the most extreme recent
assertions of power to recraft statutes to constitutional limits came in United States v. Booker,
when the Rehnquist Court cured the Sixth Amendment violation created by the federal
mandatory sentencing guidelines regime by making the guidelines advisory.85  Far from
repudiating Booker the Roberts Court has thrown itself into the task of devising the rules and
86 See David H. Gans, Severability As Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 639,
665-66, 683-85 (2008). 
87 Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2316-20 (2008) (arguing that conflict between right
to file a motion to reopen and voluntary departure requirements in the immigration context
requires allowing alien opportunity to withdraw voluntary departure motion, although not
provided for in statute);  Zuni Pub. School Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 127
S. Ct. 1534, 1543-46 (2007) (deferring to agency interpretation found to be more in keeping with
congressional intent notwithstanding tension with literal language in statute).  John Manning has
argued that these decisions are more the exception than the rule, and that the Roberts Court has
generally taken a more literal, less creative stance toward statutory text.  John F. Manning,
federalism and Constitutional Doctrine, forthcoming Harv. L. Rev.  (unpublished manuscript at 4
n.12) ; see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366-67 (2007) (refusing to
read equitable exception into jurisdictional statute to allow jurisdiction when petitioner filed an
untimely notice of appeal in reliance on a district court order).
88 See Hartnett, supra note 1111, at 1757-58 (arguing that early Roberts Court decisions
“have the potential to stand as important markers on the road to a more modest judiciary”);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Overview of the Term: The Rule of Law and Roberts’s Revolution of
Restraint, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 495, 515-17 (2007) (characterizing Roberts Court’s decision in
Ayotte as an example of judicial restraint and as displaying a modest attitude); see also Nathaniel
Persily, Reading Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law
Decisions, 2008 Sup Ct Rev. __ (unpublished manuscript at 28) (arguing that the Court’s as-
applied election law decisions reflect an effort by Chief Justice Roberts to “proceed
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doctrines needed for the new advisory system to work.86  Indeed, the Roberts Court has assumed
extensive remedial powers in some nonconstitutional contexts as well, at times reading statutes
quite flexibly and creatively to achieve results that it believes best reflect congressional intent.87
The Court’s assertion of broad remedial authority indicates that facial challenges will
likely encounter an uphill battle, as the Court may feel competent to trim even substantially
unconstitutional measures down to acceptable proportions.  Yet at the same time, that the Court
is not opposed to granting broad relief suggests that as-applied challenges could prove a viable
mechanism for vindicating constitutional rights, as in WRTL II.  Moreover, the Court’s rejection
of a facial challenge may have little substantive consequence if the Court justifies such rejection,
as in Washington State Grange, by indicating a measure’s possible constitutional applications
and thereby sketching the constitutional parameters that govern its enforcement. 
C. The Roberts Court’s View of the Judicial Role
Another factor that may affect the Roberts Court’s stance on facial and as-applied
challenges is its understanding of the judicial role.  Some have viewed the Court’s recent
emphasis on as-applied challenges as displaying a modest or minimalist approach to the judicial
role,88 in keeping with Chief Justice Roberts’ own description of his judicial philosophy at his
incrementally” and “exude restraint and minimalism, while enuring (somewhat paradoxically)
that courts will remain actively and intimately involved in the minutiae of election law.”).  For a
definition of minimalism as emphasizing incrementalism and narrow decisions, see Cass R.
Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court ix-xi (1999).
89 Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief Justice
of the United States, 109th Cong. 158 (2005) (Justice Roberts said that he preferred, if anything,
to be known as a “modest judge”). 
90 Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184,
1200-03 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (challenging majority’s “wait-and-see approach” and arguing that
the contested statute does not survive rationality review and is facially unconstitutional);
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626-27 (Scalia, J. concurring)
(arguing that the statute is facially valid and that the lead opinion’s as-applied approach is
inappropriate in “an area where the dos and don’ts need to be known in advance” and a case-by-
case analysis “would prove especially disruptive”)
91 Washington State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1191.
92 Indeed, some argue that such a broad remedial role is more of an intrusion.  See Gans,
supra note 86, at 643-44 (arguing that a generous severability doctrine results in “lawmaking
with a democracy deficit” and “crates the wrong set of incentives for legislatures”)..
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confirmation hearings.89  There are, to be sure, minimalist dimensions to these decisions, perhaps
most clearly illuminated by contrasting the as-applied emphasis of Washington State Grange and
Crawford with the opinions in those cases authored by Justice Scalia.  In both, Scalia adopted a
facial analysis, although in Washington State Grange he argued for facial invalidation whereas in
Crawford he advocated for facial validation.90  Either way, the constitutionality of the measure
was definitively resolved, whereas the Court’s approach left more room for incremental, fact-
specific evolution of the constitutional principles at stake.  Moreover, the Court frequently
invokes institutional modesty in these decisions, cautioning that “[f]acial challenges . . . run
contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint” and “threaten to short circuit the
democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being
implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.”91
Yet that said, from other perspectives the Roberts Court’s facial/as-applied jurisprudence
is not particularly modest in approach.  Although avoiding the need to invalidate legislative
measures wholesale, the Court’s willingness to expansively recraft statutes to meet constitutional
requirements is arguably just as much or more of an intrusion into the legislative sphere.92  In
addition, these decisions are notable for their strategic aspect, with the Court using the facial/as-
applied distinction as mechanism to avoid directly overruling recent precedent and achieve a
majority or unity on a decision.  WRTL II is the most obvious example, with the Court there
manipulating the as-applied nature of the challenge as a means to undercut the precedential force
of McConnell without direct overruling.  In a similar vein, the Court’s narrow as-applied
93 See Metzger, supra note 2, at 879-80 (noting that different justices’ stance on the
availability of facial challenges appeared to depend on the result they favored in the case at hand
and on the need to achieve a majority).  Even the specific move of using the facial/as-applied
distinction to evade recent precedent has arguably been done before. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 551-52 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s decision
sustaining Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as within Congress’s power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment on an as-applied basis was inconsistent with the
Court’s recent Section 5 precedent).
94 For a similar view of Crawford, see Persily, supra note 88 (unpublished manuscript at
8-9).
95 See text accompanying note ? supra (discussing Justice Scalia’s rejection of the as-
applied approach in Washington State Grange and Crawford); see also WRTL II, 127. S. Ct. at
2683-84 & n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.)
Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1650-51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer,
JJ.) (disagreeing with the majority’s rejection of a facial challenge).  Chief Justice Roberts either
wrote, joined, or concurred fully in all of the decisions discussed here emphasizing the facial/as-
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approach in both Ayotte and Georgia seems motivated by a desire to achieve greater unanimity
and avoid contentious decisions at a time of transition.  Even Gonzales’ invocation of as-applied
challenges has a strategic edge; although the majority was willing to overrule some aspects of
Stenberg, the possibility of subsequent as-applied challenges allowed the Court to avoid directly
confronting precedent holding that abortion restrictions must contain medical necessity
exceptions.
That the facial/as-applied distinction is employed to such strategic ends is nothing new.93 
But it suggests that the rejection of facial challenges in these decisions may be result-driven at
root.  Such doubts are reinforced by the fact that the Court in Heller and Davis sustained facial
challenges without explaining why as-applied challenges were not more institutionally
appropriate.  This strategic dimension similarly raises questions about whether as-applied
challenges will consistently provide a meaningful opportunity for asserting constitutional rights. 
Although in WRTL II an as-applied challenge yielded robust protection, it seems unlikely that the
as-applied route preserved in Gonzales or Crawford will have the same effect, given the
evidentiary burdens the Court imposes on such suits.94  
As a result, it is hard to see the Court’s emphasis on as-applied challenges as reflecting a
deep-seated and transsubstantive view of the judicial role in constitutional adjudication, as
opposed to considerations more closely tied to the specific decisions at hand.  Indeed, it is not
clear that a majority of the Roberts Court believes that an as-applied, incrementalist approach to
constitutional litigation actually is generally the proper stance for the Court to take.  Although all
members of the Court have at times signed onto decisions emphasizing as-applied challenges,
three justices—Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts—seem most enamored
of the facial/as-applied distinction, while others are often far more skeptical.95  On the other
applied distinction, with Justices Kennedy and Alito following suit in all but one—WRTL II for
Justice Kennedy, Crawford for Justice Alito.
96 See Linda Greenhouse, On Court that Defied Labeling, Kennedy Made the Boldest
Mark, N.Y.Times, June 29, 2008, at A1; SCOTUSblog Super StatPack - OT07 Term Recap at 3-
6, available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/superstatpackot07.pdf.
97 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 2, at 251-64, 281-82; Fallon, supra note 1, at 1324, 1350-51;
Metzger, supra note 2, at 888-89; Monaghan, supra note 71, at 24, 29.
98 128 S. Ct at 2818
99 127 S. Ct. at 1638.
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hand, given the importance of the votes of these three justices—especially Justice Kennedy—in
contentious cases,96 their greater affinity for as-applied challenges suggest that an emphasis on
such challenges will continue to be a recurrent theme in the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence.
D. The Importance of Substantive Constitutional Law 
Perhaps above all else, these decisions demonstrate that substantive constitutional law
drives the Court’s approach to facial and as-applied challenges.  That substantive constitutional
law determines the availability of facial challenges has been long acknowledged, and again is not
a new development with the Roberts Court.97  What differentiates the Roberts Court’s decisions,
and what leads it to reject facial challenges in contexts when such challenges were previously
sanctioned, is instead its view of the content of substantive constitutional doctrines involved.  
The two decisions that best demonstrate the role played by the Roberts Court’s changed
constitutional understandings are Heller and Gonzales.   Heller’s willingness to entertain a facial
challenge is hard to understand absent the substantive conclusion that handgun bans are per se
unconstitutional, no matter what other weapons are available for self-defense, and indeed the
majority comes out as states as much.98  So, too, Gonzales’ rejection of the facial challenges
turned centrally on the Court’s substantive view that health exceptions are not constitutionally
required when uncertainty exists about the likely impact of an abortion restriction on women’s
health.99  
Moreover, both Heller and Gonzales represent instances in which the Court altered
governing constitutional understandings in ways that transformed its receptivity to facial
challenges.  Second Amendment challenges had been routinely dismissed, without even as-
applied caveats, for many decades prior to Heller, a result of governing doctrine that identified
Second Amendment rights as not extending beyond the right to bear arms in conjunction with
100 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2823, n.2, 2844-46 (2008)
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (discussing precedent limiting the Second Amendment right to bear arms
to the context of militia service); Siegel, supra note 33, at 201-35 (describing the social forces
driving the evolution of the Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment)
101 This greater sympathy is most evident in the striking passage in which the majority
argued that the government was justified in banning the intact D&E procedure to protect
women’s psychological health: “It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns,
only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull
and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.”
Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634.  Casey, by contrast, expressed suspicion of paternalistic views of
women in rejecting Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement. 505 U.S. 833, 896-99
(1992).  Gonzales also applied the undue burden test in a more lenient fashion, assessing the
degree of burden imposed by the intact D&E ban for all women to whom it applied, 127 S.Ct. at
1639, whereas the Casey majority had insisted on assessing the degree of burden in regard to
those women for whom the spousal notification requirement would be a restriction, 505 U.S. at
894 (“The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute operates;
it begins there.”)
102 Id. at 1639.  Changed constitutional understandings were also obviously central in the
Court’s willingness to uphold a broad as-applied challenge in WRTL II.   See supra text
accompanying notes 18-22.  The emphasis on as-applied challenges in Crawford and
Washington State Grange similarly appear to signal changed substantive understandings of the
rights involved, though whether these decisions represent a new direction in governing
constitutional law is more unclear.  See Persily, supra note88, at 3, 9-10, 25.
103 Fallon, supra note 1, at 1324.  As Fallon insightfully noted, substantive constitutional
law matters because governing constitutional law not only will determine if a challenged statute
is unconstitutional in all or a large part of its applications, but in addition will control the degree
to which the meaning of a statute “must be relatively fully specified at the time of its first
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militia service.100  By contrast, Gonzales’s view on when medical necessity exceptions must be
included in abortion restrictions represented a retraction from prior understandings, most
recently evident in Stenberg, about the contexts to which such exceptions are constitutionally
required.  More generally, Gonzales displayed far greater sympathy for abortion regulation than
was evident in either Stenberg or Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
the 1992 decision that established the Court’s current undue burden analysis for assessing the
constitutionality of abortion regulation.101  It is no surprise, then, that the Gonzales majority
disagreed with those decisions’ willingness to entertain facial challenges.102 
One consequence is that, as in the past, “the availability of facial challenges varies on a
doctrine-by-doctrine basis and is a function of the applicable substantive tests of constitutional
validity.”103  It further follows that new limitations on the ability to successfully vindicate
application,” thereby precluding case-by-case determination of the constitutionality of different
applications.  Id. at 1347.
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constitutional rights through facial challenges under the Roberts Court will, at root, reflect
retraction in the scope of underlying substantive rights at issue.  The different breadth of the as-
applied option preserved in WRTL II and Gonzales similarly reinforces the conclusion that
substantive constitutional law is the driving force here, not any general principles about the
appropriate form for asserting constitutional claims.
CONCLUSION
Resistance to facial challenges is a recurring theme of the Roberts Court’s early years. 
Yet close analysis of the Court’s decisions suggests that its approach to facial and as-applied
challenges is largely consistent with prior practice.  Despite occasional description of as-applied
challenges in narrow terms, it has expressly preserved the possibility that as-applied challenges
could be brought pre-enforcement and allowed an as-applied challenge to be the vehicle for
broad relief.  It has also followed the Rehnquist Court in asserting wide remedial discretion to
sever statutes to fit constitutional requirements, and even its strategic use of the facial/as-applied
distinction is not new.  Nor is the Roberts Court’s resistance to facial challenges absolute; it has
not only sustained some facial challenges, but done so without offering much explanation as to
why an as-applied approach was not more appropriate.  What has changed is the Court’s
understanding of substantive constitutional law, in some instances taking a narrower view of
constitutional rights and in some offering more robust protection.  And it is substantive
constitutional law that determines not just the availability of facial challenges, but in addition
whether as-applied challenges are meaningful mechanism for asserting constitutional rights. 
Hence, the practical impact of the Court’s facial/as-applied jurisprudence can not be assessed at
a general level, but must instead be approached on a doctrine- by-doctrine basis.  The real
question in the end is whether the Court is developing specific constitutional doctrines in ways
that expand or contract the substantive scope of individual rights.
